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 James Tobin (1918-2002) is best known as an outstanding “Old Keynesian” econo-
mist whose contributions were recognized by the 1981 Bank of Sweden Prize in
Memory of Alfred Nobel. His keen devotion to the reduction of poverty, inequality,
and discrimination is less well known. This commitment extended beyond academic
research: at the Tobin memorial at Yale in April 2002, the political scientist Robert
Dahl recalled how he and Tobin had spent the “Freedom Summer” of 1964 in Missis-
sippi in the hope that the presence of the two Yale professors would afford some
protection to the student volunteers in the civil rights movement, after three volun-
teers had been murdered by segregationist extremists. Tobin was acutely aware of
living in the country’s richest state and in one of its ten poorest cities.1
 Tobin recalled that “When a distinguished colleague in political science asked
me about ten years ago why economists did not talk about the distribution of income
any more, I followed my pro forma denial of his factual premise by replying that the
potential gains to the poor from full employment and growth were much larger, and
much less socially and politically divisive, than those from redistribution. One rea-
son that distribution has returned to the forefront of professional and public atten-
tion is that great progress was made in the postwar period, and especially in the
1960’s, toward solving the problems of full employment and growth” [1970, 263]. The
first two sections of “On Improving the Economic Status of the Negro” [Tobin 1965],
following the introduction, were titled “The Importance of a Tight Labor Market”
and “Why Don’t We Have a Tight Labor Market?” When oil price shocks raised the
U.S. inflation rate in the 1970s, Tobin urged a tax-based incomes policy to reduce
inflation, rather than a recession induced by tight monetary policy, because the hard-
ship of recession would fall most heavily on low-skilled workers [forward to Colan-
der, 1986].
 Beyond working for Keynesian macroeconomic policies that would diminish pov-
erty by encouraging economic growth and low unemployment, Tobin presented an
ambitious program for social policy. In “It Can be Done! Conquering Poverty in the
U.S. by 1976” [1967], Tobin held that R. Sargent Shriver’s goal of eliminating pov-
erty by the Bicentennial could be achieved, not by reliance on the programs of Shriver’s
Office of Economic Opportunity (programs to improve health, education, vocational
training, and community development) but rather by macroeconomic policies for
general prosperity combined with means-tested cash transfers such as a negative
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Tobin was recalled to Washington in December 1963 to work on the 1964 Economic
Report of the President, editing the chapter (principally written by Robert Lampman)
that outlined the War on Poverty [Tobin, 1996, 231]. Tobin [1965; 1966; 1967; 1968;
1970] went beyond the Great Society’s War on Poverty to propose large-scale means-
tested cash transfers to reduce poverty without interfering with market determina-
tion of relative prices, a position which he shared with Milton Friedman [1962, 191-
92]. He wished to pair this with “non-market egalitarian distributions of commodi-
ties essential to life and citizenship” [1970, 276] such as education, food stamps, and
basic housing, a position that contrasted with Friedman’s Chicago School approach
and that was emphasized in Tobin’s Henry Simons Lecture at the University of Chi-
cago, “On Limiting the Domain of Inequality” [1970].
Tobin, Pechman, and Mieszkowski stated that many eligible poor people did not
receive local welfare because “recipients are subject to numerous indignities by the
procedures employed to enforce the means test and other conditions to determine
who is eligible for help and how much. ... Administration of public assistance is now
largely a matter of policing the behavior of the poor to prevent them from ‘cheating’
the taxpayers, rather than a program for helping them improve their economic sta-
tus through their own efforts” [1967, 1]. This view of public assistance resembles
that of Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward [1971] of public welfare as a system
of social control. The deliberate imposition of indignities and stigma to discourage
resort to public assistance was in keeping with the Poor Law Report of 1834 [Checkland
and Checkland, 1974].
Furthermore, Tobin, Pechman, and Mieszkowski noted that “The means test is
in effect a 100 percent tax on the welfare recipient’s own earnings; for every dollar
he earns, his assistance is reduced by a dollar” [1967, 1] (as Tobin [1965, 892] also
noted). Until 1967, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) featured such
an effective 100 percent implicit tax rate [Besley and Coate 1995, 190n], a prohibi-
tive disincentive to work that risked trapping recipients in the welfare system. Tobin
[1965, 891-92] suggested instead a lower effective tax rate in the form of reducing
assistance payments (Tobin, Pechman, and Mieszkowski [1967, 27] recommended a
rate of 40 percent) so that the working poor would receive some public assistance
until they earned three times the basic income guarantee. Tobin, Pechman, and
Mieszkowski [1967, 26] recognized that while those already receiving AFDC or other
assistance with an effective tax rate of 100 percent would have an incentive to work
more under the proposed negative income tax (NIT), other recipients of NIT “work
and earn less when the government makes them better off and raises their marginal
tax rate from zero or 14-20 percent to 33 or 50 percent.” The net effect on incentives
to work has been highly controversial in studies of the outcomes of the New Jersey
Negative Income Tax Experiment [Pechman and Timpane, 1975] and the Seattle
and Denver Income Maintenance Experiments (to which the Fall 1980 issue of the
Journal of Human Resources Vol. 15 was devoted), leading to a literature on how to
design income-maintenance programs when it is not possible to observe how much
work-effort would be provided in the absence of an income guarantee.2
 In contrast to Herrnstein and Murray [1994] who attributed persistent poverty
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tation of behavior to the 100 percent marginal tax rate implicit in the existing wel-
fare system. Tobin’s standpoint recalls that of John Stuart Mill, who rejected racial
or ethnic explanations for the poverty of the Irish peasantry, focusing instead on
land-tenure laws that gave neither landowner nor tenant incentive to invest in rais-
ing productivity.
Like Tobin, Milton Friedman (with Rose Friedman [1962, 192]) and Rose Fried-
man [1965] stressed the importance of replacing a fixed minimum with a combina-
tion of a guaranteed minimum income and a continued incentive to earn income, a
proposal previously mentioned by Stigler [1946], although the Friedmans recom-
mended a lower guaranteed minimum income than that proposed by Tobin. Milton
Friedman estimated that “A program which supplemented the incomes of the 20
percent of the consumer units with the lowest incomes so as to raise them to the
lowest income of the rest would cost less than half of what we are now spending”
(with Rose Friedman [1962, 194]).3 The problem is that the poor do not have enough
purchasing power, not that the relative price of housing or some other good is incor-
rect. Cash transfers are preferable to in-kind transfers because the recipient is able
to choose how to spend the transfer. As Tobin explained,
While concerned laymen who observe people with shabby housing or
too little to eat instinctively want to provide them with decent hous-
ing and adequate food, economists instinctively want to provide them
with more cash income. Then they can buy the housing and food if
they want to, and if they choose not to, the presumption is that they
have a better use for the money. To those who complain about the
unequal distribution of shelter or of food, our first response—and
Simons’—is that they should look at the distribution of wealth and
income...
This answer rarely satisfies the intelligent egalitarian lay-
man. He knows, partly because he has learned it from economists,
that there are pragmatic limits on the redistributive use of taxation
and cash transfers. These instruments are not as neutral in their
allocative effects as Simons appeared to believe; they may seriously
distort choices between work and leisure...
The layman therefore wonders why we cannot arrange things
so that certain central crucial commodities are distributed less un-
equally than is general income... The idea has great social appeal.
The social conscience is more offended by severe inequality in nutri-
tion and basic shelter, or access to medical care or to legal assistance,
than by inequality in automobiles, books, clothes, furniture, boats.
Can we somehow remove the necessities of life and health from the
prizes that serve as incentives for economic activity, and instead let
people strive and compete for non-essential luxuries and amenities?
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Where Tobin diverged from the Friedmans and the Chicago School was in his
advocacy of “specific egalitarianism,” which he defined as “non-market egalitarian
distributions of commodities essential to life and citizenship” that are in inelastic
supply: “In some instances, notably education and medical care, a specific egalitar-
ian distribution today may be essential for improving the distribution of human capital
and earning capacity tomorrow” [1970, 276-77]. He recognized medical care and hous-
ing as difficult practical cases whose supply is inelastic in the short run but respon-
sive to demand in the long run. Speaking of “socialized medicine,” Tobin argued that
“Although this prospect may shock many people today, including many at the Uni-
versity of Chicago, it would not have shocked Henry Simons” [1970, 274], quoting
Simons [1948, 68] on the “remarkable opportunities for extending the range of so-
cialized consumption (medical services, recreation, education, music, drama, etc.)”
As examples of specific egalitarianism, Tobin wished to preclude purchase of substi-
tutes by military draftees (as had been common during the American Civil War) or
the sale of votes (as in England’s “rotten boroughs” before the Reform Bill), because
votes are in intrinsically short supply and “A vote market would concentrate politi-
cal power in the rich, and especially in those who owe their wealth to government
privilege” [1970, 269-70]. In contrast, Milton Friedman worried about recipients of
negative income tax or of old-age pensions being allowed to vote, lest the system “be
converted into one under which a majority imposes taxes for its own benefit on an
unwilling minority” [1962, 194-95]. Tobin worried about the political power of the
rich, Milton Friedman about the political power of the poor.
Looking back, Tobin concluded sadly, “I am afraid that it’s a mistake to declare
wars against social and economic conditions or national crusades for societal re-
forms. The goals are elusive, the troops unruly, the enemies amorphous. Wars on
poverty, energy dependence and drugs have proved to be incapable of sustaining the
degrees of commitment essential to their prosecution, even by the Presidents who
declared them. William James longed for moral equivalents of war, but evidently
Americans can’t do better than football” [1996, 232]. Tobin lamented that “The ma-
jority is losing interest in full employment and economic growth, and appears quite
willing to let youth and poor and minorities bear the brunt of anti-inflationary policy”
[1977, 477]. The Nixon Administration’s Family Allowance Plan, twice passed by the
House of Representatives, was blocked in Senate committee by a coalition of conser-
vatives opposed to a guaranteed minimum income and liberals opposed to work re-
quirements [Moynihan, 1973]. With Tobin as an advisor, the McGovern Presidential
campaign proposed income redistribution through the income tax, an attempt char-
acterized by Tobin, Brainard, Shoven, and Bulow as “the 1972 debacle” [1973, 585].
The political tide turned so much against a guaranteed minimum income that in
1996, after two Presidential vetoes of bills that would have also ended health ben-
efits for the poor, AFDC was replaced by block grants to states for “work-first,” time-
limited Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) [Blank, 1996]. Even re-
authorization of TANF has become problematic [Blank and Haskins, 2001; Peterson,
2002]. Prevailing neo-conservative rhetoric recalls the argument of the proponents
of the New Poor Law of 1834 that family allowances and other public assistance are
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and raising tax burdens [Persky, 1997; Checkland and Checkland, 1974]. This trend
away from redistribution extends beyond the United States: the Progressive Conser-
vative Party campaigned for a guaranteed annual income in the Canadian federal
election of 1974, yet when the Progressive Conservatives won provincial office in
Ontario in 1995, their “Common-Sense Revolution”cut benefits and sharply limited
eligibility for a million recipients of social assistance.
Despite these political setbacks and the continuing chilly political climate, there
is still a valuable message of hope in Tobin’s insistence that alleviation of poverty,
inequality, and racial discrimination “can be accomplished within existing political
and economic institutions” [1964, 878] by a combination of general egalitarianism
(cash transfers guaranteeing a minimum income while maintaining incentives to
earn more) and specific egalitarianism in health care and education. The historical
record suggests that poverty can be reduced by redistribution. Whatever the failures
in achieving the social and cultural goals of policymakers, Christopher Jencks [1992,
70-91] has shown that, contrary to the claims of Murray [1984], anti-poverty pro-
grams successfully combined with economic growth to reduce the US poverty rate
from 19 percent in 1965 to 13 percent in 1980, to reduce infant mortality among
blacks from 4.2 percent of live births in 1965 to 2.2 percent in 1980, to increase non-
white life expectancy from 64.1 years in 1965 to 69.5 years in 1980. Even with regard
to social and cultural goals of policymakers, Jencks points out that rising rates of
illegitimacy and divorce have been general throughout society, not just among re-
cipients of public assistance.
Contrary to the belief of Herrnstein and Murray [1994] that redistribution can-
not alleviate poverty and inequality because the underlying causes are inherited
genetic differences, to the belief of Murray [1984] that redistribution only worsens
the material conditions of the poor because of perverse incentives and a culture of
dependency, and to the belief of radicals that effective redistribution is impossible in
a capitalist society, Tobin [1964; 1965; 1966; 1967; 1968; 1970; 1996] believed in the
power of government to guarantee a basic standard of living, to limit the domain of
inequality, and to implement redistributive programs whose incentives would be far
preferable to the implicit 100 percent marginal tax rate of earlier welfare programs.
He always offered such proposals as a complement to Keynesian policies promoting
economic growth and full employment, not a substitute. A tight labor market was
the first condition for reducing poverty and inequality. The evidence surveyed by
Jencks [1992, especially Chapter 2] indicates that even the redistributive programs
of 1965-80, which did not go nearly as far as Tobin proposed, considerably improved
the material conditions of the poor. Tobin made a cogent and deeply-felt case for
acting to alleviate poverty and limit the domain of inequality. The political climate is
currently hostile to that case, as it is to Keynesian policies for macroeconomic stabi-
lization and full employment. That is no argument against the desirability of such
policies. James Tobin is, rightly, renowned as a macroeconomist and monetary econo-
mist, an outstanding “Old Keynesian.” In evaluating his message to the economics
profession, it should be remembered that his macroeconomics was part of his wider
commitment to bringing economic analysis and reasoned argument into battle against
unemployment, instability, poverty, and inequality.564 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
NOTES
Presented to the Association for Evolutionary Economics at the Allied Social Science Associations
meetings, Washington, DC, January 5, 2003, and to the Eastern Economic Association, New York City,
February 22, 2003. I am grateful to Geoff Hodgson and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.
1. See Tobin [1996, 252] comparing incomes in New Haven and the rest of its county.
2. See Besley and Coate [1995] and references given there.
3. See Tobin, Pechman, and Mieszkowski [1967, 23-27] and Tobin [1968, 103-105] for estimates of the
budgetary cost of different negative income tax plans.
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